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1 Introduction
Till recently, two important segments of electricity markets - transmission and
distribution - were regarded as examples of natural monopolies, whose own-
ership (or at least management) should be left in the hands of public sec-
tor/government. However, technological advancements in the transmission sec-
tor have spurred the debate on the feasibility of merchant investments, and
welfare outcomes thereof in the electricity sector. Merchant investments in the
transmission sector refer to investments made by non-governmental (private) in-
vestors who are transferred the property rights of the line. As Joskow and Tirole
(2005) point out, merchant investments rely, [O]n competition, free entry and
decentralized property-rights based institutions, and market-based pricing of
transmission service to govern transmission investment.These merchant lines
are regarded as e¤ective means to solve the problem of transmission capacity
decit, which has been a problem for several countries across the world, in-
cluding the European countries. With the entry, and subsequent expansion of
renewable energy supply, which signicantly a¤ects energy prices (see, for in-
stance, Clò and DAdamo, 2014), the economic e¤ects of shortfalls are further
exacerbated. For example, a recent report by ENTSO-E (2012) estimates that
in Europe alone, 52300 km of high voltage transmission lines have to be added
by 2020.
For this reason, while the debate on welfare e¤ects of merchant investments
is still on-going, an increasing number of markets, including the EU countries,
Australia and Argentina, have moved towards allowing them. Within this pol-
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icy framework that contemplates merchant transmission, some key questions
emerge: How should the transmission market be designed and regulated, should
the generators themselves be allowed to invest in the transmission network, etc.
Given the importance of the questions pertaining to market design, Joskow and
Tiroles (2005) claim that . . . there has been surprisingly little research on the
institutions governing transmission network,still remains valid.
In this context, our paper contributes to the existing literature by theoret-
ically characterizing welfare e¤ects of two aspects of the market design - the
mode of capacity utilization and vertical integration between generators and
merchant investors. To elaborate further, we compare the e¤ects on welfare
and competitiveness of transmission sector under two alternative settings: (i)
The investor has to o¤er the entire installed capacity for transmission (a must
o¤er(Mo) condition), and (ii) The investor can choose the amount of capacity
that can be o¤ered for transmission (a non-must o¤er (NMo) condition). On
the prima facie, it is not clear which of the alternatives is welfare enhancing.
An Mo provision prohibits capacity withholding, thereby mandating the lines
owner to make available the full lines capacity at the market price. While it has
been generally recognized that these constraints have to be imposed on existing
non-merchant lines (often built under regulated regimes), it is not clear whether
or not such rules should be applicable to the merchant investment case as well.
Imposition of Must O¤er(Mo) provision can inhibit entry of new investors, or
induce investors to ine¢ ciently downsize their investments. On the other hand,
it is clear that since a Non-Must O¤er(NMo) provision encourages capacity
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withholding, it can create certain deadweight loss ex post. Therefore, character-
izing the circumstances under which one alternative is welfare enhancing over
the other, and the competitive structure that needs to prevail become important
from a policy perspective.
A prominent feature of electricity transmission market is the uctuating de-
mand across various time periods. The rst issue we investigate in this paper
is to understand the e¤ects of Mo and NMo in the case where there are mul-
tiple periods with varying demand. In this scenario we model both monopoly
situation as well as sequential entry. Under monopoly an interesting trade-o¤
emerges withMo provision. Intuitively, if the rst mover installs capacity keep-
ing peak period in mind, then the price of transmission in o¤-peak period is
essentially lower (or even zero). On the contrary, NMo allows the monopolist
to plan for peak period, and still serve the lean period by withholding su¢ cient
capacity. Therefore,Mo provision can lead to the monopolist under-investing in
the market in order to keep lean period prices higher. We nd that the monopoly
capacity invested is weakly larger under NMo when compared to Mo. Further,
prots underMo are weakly lower when compared to NMo. When we allow for
sequential entry, however, the results are not unambiguous. For some parameter
values we show that NMo encourages greater transmission of electricity, and
allows more easy entry than when compared to Mo. Brunekreeft and Newbery
(2006) answer slightly similar question in the context of single period without
demand uctuations. They show that in a scenario with multiple potential
entrants and sequential entry with quantity competition, Mo provision yields
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mixed results. Mo provides a powerful form of commitment device for a rst
mover investor in order to deter the entry of other potential investors. Such
pre-emptive investment is not always possible under the NMo provision be-
cause, if the rst mover were to invest in excessive capacity, he might nd it in
his interest to withhold some capacity should entry indeed take place. While
such commitment may lead to higher prot and higher capacity choice of the
rst mover, the overall economy may su¤er because, under certain conditions,
it reduces overall investment in the transmission network.
The second issue we investigate is to characterize the e¤ects of vertical inte-
gration between merchant investors and electricity generators, and the welfare
properties of the capacity utilization regimes Mo and NMo, under these cir-
cumstances. In the legal scholarship, the question of the desirability of vertical
integration has been analyzed by Nowak (2010), who argues that such integra-
tion can hinder e¢ ciency in the market, and by de Hauteclocque and Rious
(2011), who argue that such vertical integration ought to be allowed.
Therefore, an important question to understand here is under what condi-
tions is such integration better (or worse) from an economic e¢ ciency stand-
point. This question is particularly signicant when the nodes are asymmetric in
the e¢ ciency of electricity generation, and some generators have market power
in one of the nodes. We show that in the case in which the generator in the
e¢ cient node has market power (monopoly), the choice regime (Mo or NMo)
does not make a di¤erence. Only the vertically integrated generator, and not
an independent merchant investor, has an incentive to invest in merchant trans-
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mission. This becomes an important result from a policy perspective. The main
lesson is that in markets where e¢ cient nodes are characterized by the presence
of signicant market power to the generators, merchant investment by vertically
integrated rms improves welfare, regardless of whichever capacity utilization
regime is in place. This result is similar to Van Koten (2011), who, albeit in a
very di¤erent framework (capacity is allocated through an explicit auction with
many bidders with private values) nds that the the value of merchant invest-
ment is larger if it is undertaken by an investor who owns an e¢ cient generator
in the exporting zone. Sauma and Oren (2009) also obtain a similar result, but
their analysis does not consider the di¤erential incentives brought about byMo
and NMo respectively.
When the ine¢ cient node has market power, on the other hand, we nd
that the results are not so straightforward. There are cases where allowing for
vertical integration would lead to reduction in consumer welfare. Further, if
there is vertical integration, Mo is generally less harmful than NMo is. This
result mirrors that obtained by Joskow and Tirole (2000), although in a di¤erent
framework, and in particular in comparing nancial transmission rights vis-à-vis
physical transmission rights. Therefore, our results agree with de Hauteclocque
and Rious (2011) - who claim that merchant investment by generators ought
to be allowed - only in the case where the generators in e¢ cient zone exhibit
market power. In the other case of generators in ine¢ cient node having greater
market power, the claim by Nowak (2010) seems more justied.
A nal issue we address in this paper concerns collusive behavior on the part
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of merchant investors. The economics literature has suggested several ways to
model collusion. A common insight is that excess capacity left idle, can be used
as a threat to punish the defector. Therefore, if there is a fear of collusion among
merchant investors, the policy maker should consider imposing Mo as against
NMo in order to preclude the usage of excess capacity as a threat.
Finally, observe that, in the context of liberalized electricity markets, the
Mo rule on merchant investments corresponds to awarding the merchant in-
vestor nancial transmission rights (FTRs) on the line, or physical trasnmission
rights (PTRs) coupled with a use-it-or-lose-it (UIOLI) provision. On the other
hand, NMo may be regarded as equivalent to awarding the merchant investor
"unconstrained" (that is, not associated to a use-it-or-lose it provision) PTRs.
The main ndings of the paper from a policy perspective, can be summa-
rized as follows: (i) In the case of time-varying demand, more research is required
before concluding which policy choice (Mo or NMo) is better. Theoretically
speaking, while we see greater capacity installed under NMo it need not neces-
sarily translate into higher transmission. (ii) In the case where e¢ cient node has
market power, the regulator has little choice but to allow vertical integration,
because only the generator has any incentive to invest in merchant transmission.
(iii) In case there is a possibility of collusion, Mo regime should be imposed.
The questions addressed in this paper relate to merchant investments and the
ensuing regulation and market design in the context of electricity transmission.
However, these questions have broader policy implications beyond electricity
industry itself. Any industry that operates signicantly through transmission
7
and distribution channels Oil and Natural Gas, for instance would nd these
questions relevant from policy perspective. The natural gas industry has many
features similar to the electricity industry, and relies on extensive transmission
networks. In the Indian case, for example, a part of the pipeline network is
held by the public sector reneries like Indian Oil Corporation and Hindustan
Petroleum Corporation. In the US Oil and Natural Gas market, Shell, which
is also one of the primary producers of natural gas, owns signicant amount
of pipeline network. Therefore, welfare implications characterized in this paper
become relevant in these cases as well.
In the next section, we sketch our basic model, and characterize the simple
equilibrium. In the next section, we look extend the model to consider time
varying demand function. Subsequently, in the next section, we extend this
further to incorporate what happens when merchant investors also have market
power in generating sectors, either in the exporting or the importing node.
Finally, we discuss the aspect of collusion among merchant investors. The nal
section concludes.
2 Model Setup
We consider merchant investments in energy transmission capacity when ca-
pacity costs are sunk once incurred, and the production technology exhibits in-
creasing returns to scale. We assume a standard setting for the energy market:
a two-node network, with no transmission losses. A transmission line inter-
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connects the two nodes: North (N) and South (S). We denote the aggregate
supply of generators in Region I to be qi, I = N;S. Without loss of generality,
we assume that N has a more e¢ cent generation sector than S. The aggregate
cost function in the N is CN (qN ) = cNqN , with cN > 0. Similarly, for S, the
aggregate cost function is given by CS(qS) = cNqS + 12cSq
2
S , with cS > 0.
Assume that the demand for energy in S is given by: DS(pS) = a   pS .
There is no demand for electricity in N .1 In the baseline version of our model,
we will assume perfect competition in the generation sector. We will relax this
assumption in susbequent extensions. The assumptions of perfect competition
in the generation sector and e¢ cient market design (EMD) (Schweppe et al.,
1988) yield the following:
Q =
a  cN
1 + cS
+
cS
1 + cS
q
where Q is the equilibrium energy consumption in the S and q is the overall ow
on the transmission line. The total amount of electricity that can ow between
the nodes is constrained by total capacity, which is given as sum of capacities
installed by individual investors. How investors choose equilibrium capacities
under the two modes of capacity utilization (Mo versus NMo) forms the main
point this paper intends to make. Further, the equilibrium nodal price di¤erence
1Another way to interpret this is to say that the demand in Node N is normalized to zero.
Therefore, this assumption is without loss of generality.
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 = pS   pN , is given by:
 = (a  cN ) cS
1 + cS
  cS
1 + cS
q
Let us dene  = a  cN , with  > 0, and  = cS=(1+ cS), with 0 <  < 1.
Substituting these, we obtain:
Q(q) = (1  ) + q (1)
and
(q) =    q (2)
The equation 2 can be considered as the demand for transmission.
We assume that all the rms in the transmission market share the same a¢ ne
cost function. For installing a capacity level k, every rm faces the following
cost function:
C (k) = F + rk
where r is the constant per-unit cost of capacity expansion, and F represents
the xed cost incurred. We adopt the standard simplifying assumption that
r  2 .
There are two potential investors in the market: a rst mover (represented
by I) and an entrant (represented by E). We consider the following timeline of
the game:
10
1. In the rst stage the rst mover chooses a transmission capacity and incurs
a sunk variable cost, rkI .
2. A potential entrant observes this and chooses to enter only if it is protable
to do so. In case he enters, he incurs a xed cost of F .
3. Firm E, if it enters, chooses capacity kE and, simultaneously, the two
rms choose the transmission ows qj  kj , for j = I; E. Observe that
Mo imposes the additional restriction that qj = kj unless if the capacity
is not fully required.
The rst mover and the entrant (if it decides to enter) choose their output
levels (i.e., their actual transmission ows) simultaneously. These output levels
are bound upwards by their respective installed capacities.
In this game, the rst mover may be in one of the following situations. He
could prevent entry by simply installing the monopoly capacity. In this case,
using Dixits (1980) terminology, entry is blockaded. If entry is not blockaded,
two (sub-game perfect Nash) equilibria exist, involving di¤erent actions by the
rst mover: accommodation and deterrence. Under accommodation, the rst
mover selects the optimal capacity knowing that the potential entrant will enter
the market. Under deterrence, on the other hand, the rst mover installs a
su¢ ciently high level of capacity, and manages to prevent the entrants entry in
the market.
Both the feasibility and the relative protability of accommodation and de-
terrence crucially depend on the ability of the rst mover to credibly commit,
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since the capacity installation stage. Under NMo, the rst movers commit-
ment device depends on the sunk capacity cost. Credibility is restricted (on the
upper bound) to ows that can be sustained in asymmetric Cournot equilibria,
where capacity costs are sunk for the rst mover, while they are variable for the
potential entrant. Therefore, under NMo, credibility hinges on the magnitude
of sunk costs. On the other hand, under Mo, the rule itself guarantees that the
installed capacity will be used, and will therefore be reected into a transmission
ow. As a result, Mo expands the set of transmission ows to which the rst
mover can credibly commit since the stage of capacity investment. As a result,
Mo (weakly) increases the scope for deterrence vis-à-vis NMo.
The structure of our game is slightly di¤erent from Brunekreeft and Newbery
(2006). In our game, capacity decision by E and decisions on the transmission
ow by both rms occurs simultaneously. In their game, instead, after Is ca-
pacity choice, rst E chooses capacity, and subsequently the two rms set the
transmission ow. Our modelling choice reects the notion that, in electricity
markets, long-term contracts between transmission operators and end-users of
transmisison network and can be signed (and are often mandated by the regu-
lator), and this decision occurs at the time of investment itself. This is further
reected in the fact that the rst movers quantity choice and the entrants ca-
pacity choice (and quantity choice) happen simultaneously. Despite the game
being di¤erent than the one considered in Brunekreeft and Newbery (2006),
the analysis of a single stage game shows that the results are qualitatively not
di¤erent. In particular, we nd that:
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 Entry is relatively easily deterred or blockaded under Mo, as above illus-
trated.
 Mo (weakly) increases the rst movers prot. In this game, Mo (weakly)
increases the options available to the rst mover, by (weakly) expanding
the set of transmission ows to which it can credibly commit.
 Capacity installation is higher under Mo than under NMo under two cir-
cumstances: i) when the xed cost F is low enough that accommodation
prevails under both capacity utilization regimes. In this case, the com-
mitment power provided by Mo increases, with respect to NMo, the rst
movers aggressiveness, and, as a result, the rst movers prot as well
as total output (at the expenses of the entrants prots); ii) for a subset
of parameters for which deterrence prevails under Mo, while accommo-
dation under NMo. In these cases, the rst mover under Mo installs a
higher capacity than the combined ows (by the rst mover and the new
entrant) under NMo, in order to deter entry, and, therefore, to be the
only claimant of the prot from trasnmission. 2
3 Time Varying Demand
Next, we incorporate the assumption of time varying demand in the above
model. Electricity demand varies over time, with demand being highest during
2 In the interest of space, we do not replicate these results here. The results are available
with the authors upon request.
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the peak demand periods and lowest during the o¤-peak periods, which is fur-
ther reected in the corresponding variation in the transmission demand. The
introduction of time-varying demand has signicant e¤ects on the incentives
faced by merchant investors, and alters the tradeo¤ of Mo vis-a-vis NMo. The
most signicant changes can be identied even in a setting with a monopolistic
transmission investment. Therefore, we start by looking at a monopolistic mer-
chant investor, and subsequently characterize the equilibrium under sequential
entry. Let period 1 (denoted by subscript 1) denote the peak period and pe-
riod 2 (denoted by subscript 2) be the o¤-peak or lean period. Also, let the
transmission (inverse) demand be:
1 = 11   1q1
2 = 22   2q2
in period 1 and 2 respectively. We assume: i) 1 < 2 to reect peak demand
in 1. Also, for simplicity, we set ii) 11 = 22 = . The combination of i)
and ii) implies assuming 1 > 2.
3.1 The Case of Monopoly
Consider monopoly in the merchant investment. In the NMo structure, the
investor solves the following maximization problem:
max
q1;q2
1 (q1) q1 + 2 (q2) q2   rk
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where he optimally sets q1 = k. The problem can therefore be rewritten as:
max
k;q2
1 (k) k + 2 (q2) q2   rk
s:t:q2  k
In the Mo structure, the investor is constrained to set q1 () = k, and
q2 () = max (k; q2 (0)). It solves the following:
max
k
1 (k) k +max f(2 (k) k) ; 0g   rk
NMo provides the investor with the opportunity to withhold capacity in the
o¤peak period. As a result, the investor can set both qUM1 = k and q
UM
2  k at
the prot-maximizing uncontrained monopoly level. Here, the superscript UM
stands for unconstrained monopoly and qUMt represents output level in period
t under NMo. In order to compare the two regimes, consider the di¤erential
e¤ects (between Mo and NMo) on the investors revenue stemming from a
marginal increase in capacity as a function of the initial capacity level (k).
Three regions emerge:
1. When k is su¢ ciently small, then the marginal increase in revenue for the
investor as capacity increases is the same across both regimes. We call
this Region 1
2. When k gets larger, then under NMo capacity is withheld in the o¤peak
period (and used only in peak period); since such option is not available
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underMo, the marginal benet to the investor is greater under NMo than
it is under Mo. We call this Region 2
3. When k gets even larger, to the point that 2 (k) = 0, additional capacity
is used only in the peak period and not o¤-peak even underMo. Therefore,
the marginal benet for the investor is, once again, identical across the
two regimes. We call this Region 3.
We now characterize conditions under which the equilibrium falls in each of
the three regions described above. Equilibrium falls in Region 1 when qUM1 =
qUM2 , that is, the infrastructure cost r is large relative to the di¤erence in demand
across the two periods, and, as a result, even under NMo it is e¢ cient to build
capacity only as long as it is optimal to use it in both periods. In terms of
the parameters of our model, this occurs when r > 2 (2   1). In this case,
capacity installation as well as the transmission quantity made available both
in the peak period and o¤peak is the same across the two regimes. As a result,
even prots are equal across the two arrangements.
Equilibrium falls in Region 2 when the infrastructure cost is at an intermedi-
ate level relative to the di¤erence in demand across the two periods. In terms of
the parameters of the model, this happens when 2

2   1  
q
21 + 12

<
r < 2 (2   1). In this region, the following two conditions hold: (i) qUM1 >
qUM2 and (ii) 2 (k) > 0. Condition 1 implies that the capacity installed op-
timally without any utilization constraints (hence prevailing under NMo) is
not fully utilized in the o¤-peak period; so, there is capacity withholding under
NMo. Condition 2 implies that there is positive price di¤erential across nodes,
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and hence the installed capacity has to be fully utilized even in the o¤-peak
period under Mo. In this case, under Mo, new capacity installation exhibits a
tradeo¤, since a marginal increase in k increases peak period prot (1), but
reduces o¤-peak period prot (2). Thus, the marginal revenue is larger under
NMo (where capacity withholding is allowed) than under Mo. As a result,
installed capacity as well as transmission quantity in the peak period are larger
under NMo, while capacity utilization o¤peak is larger under Mo (due to ca-
pacity withholding under NMo). Combining the various e¤ects, total welfare
(along with investors prot) turns out to be strictly higher under NMo.
Finally, equilibrium falls in Region 3 when the infrastructure cost is low (in
the parameter of our model, when r < 2

2   1  
q
21 + 12

) relative
to the di¤erence in demand across the two periods. In this region, 2 (k) = 0,
hence the marginal revenue, and therefore investment in capacity, in the same
across the two regimes. Even under Mo, it is optimal for the investor to install
capacity keeping the peak period in mind, giving up revenue from the o¤-peak
period. In this case, installed capacity as well as transmission quantity in the
peak period are the same across the two arrangements. However, under Mo
there is more capacity utilization o¤peak, and, as a result, welfare is strictly
higher under Mo, while prots are strictly higher under NMo.
The Figure below, where the solid line illustrates the marginal benet under
NMo, while the dotted line displays benets under Mo, depicts the intuition
behind these results more clearly:
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE
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The results discussed above can be summarized in the following proposition
Proposition 1 Monopoly investment in capacity is (weakly) larger under NMo
than it is underMo. However, equilibrium transmission may be greater or lower
under NMo vis-a-vis Mo.
It is also important to note that the prot of the monopolist is higher under
NMo when compared toMo because the constrained optimization always yields
inferior solution when compared to the unconstrained solution.
In terms of consumer surplus, the two regimes are equivalent when both con-
ditions i) and ii) hold. When condition i) does not hold, the larger investment
entailed by NMo increases consumer surplus under NMo. Finally, when condi-
tion ii) does not hold, the higher capacity utilization entailed by Mo increases
consumer surplus under Mo.
Therefore, since the theory is ambiguous on which regime improves consumer
welfare, it really becomes an empirical question. From a policy makers perspec-
tive, it is important to ascrtain the parameter values before a policy decision is
implemented.
3.2 Sequential Entry
Next, we characterize the case of sequential entry with time-varying demand,
where the pattern of entry is as described in Section 2. In particular, in Stage
3 (if the entrant has decided to enter in Stage 2), the entrant chooses kE and,
simultaneously, qt;E  kE , for t = 1; 2 along with the rst mover. Observe
thatMo imposes the additional constraint here that qt;j (t) = max (kj ; qt;j (0))
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for j = I; E; that is, under Mo, the transmission ow has to be equal to
capacity unless the full capacity is not needed. We consider block, deterrence
and accommodation separately for each of the three regions.
When qUM1 = q
UM
2 = k, then investment and capacity utilization are the
same underMo andNMo in monopoly. Due to the additional commitment (and
the corresponding prot reduction) induced by Mo, there is less incentive to
enter when the rst mover plays the monopoly output; hence entry is more easily
blockaded. Also, due to the same logic, entry deterrence prevails for a larger
series of parameters under Mo. Under NMo, there is more entry. The welfare
e¤ect of entry deterrence is more subtle. For some parameter values, entry
deterrence may be welfare enhancing over accommodation; in order to be able to
deter entry, the rst mover may have to install more capacity than the aggregate
capacity that would be installed under NMo. The rst movers prots, along
with welfare, would increase (at the expense of the potential entrant, who is left
out of the market).
When qUM1 > q
UM
2 , and 2 (k

Mo) = 0, in monopoly, investment is the same
across the two regimes, but underMo capacity utilization is higher. UnderMo,
entry when the rst mover installs the monopoly capacity is less protable than
under NMo because: rst, the tranmission ow chosen by the rst mover is
higher; second, the potential entrant faces additional constraints when it enters.
Therefore, entry is more easily blockaded. The same logic can be applied to
deterrence, which occurs more frequently under Mo. A tradeo¤ clearly emerges
between NMo that induces (weakly) more entry (whose welfare e¤ects have
19
been illustrated above), and Mo that induces more capacity utilization.
Finally, when qUM1 > q
UM
2 , and 2 (k

Mo) = 0, Mo involves lower capacity
installation. In this case, which of the two arrangements induces more entry is
less clear. We rst consider blockaded entry. Monopoly capacity is lower under
Mo, and this suggests more room for entry under Mo. On the other hand, the
additional constraint imposed by Mo hurts the potential entrants prot. The
parameter values determine which of the e¤ects prevails. A similar logic can
also be applied to incentives to deter entry.
Our last case (when qUM1 > q
UM
2 , and 2 (k

Mo) = 0) shows that there may
be instances in which, Mo can encourage greater entry. This e¤ect results from
the disincentives to invest underMo due to the constraint of using the available
capacity even in the o¤peak period, thereby hurting the corresponding prots.
In other words, in such circumstances, underMo deterring entry through excess
capacity installation might be too costly for the rst mover because it might
mean low prices during the lean period. Hence, NMo produces more entry.
Instead, in the two other cases (i.e., qUM1 = q
UM
2 = k, and q
UM
1 > q
UM
2 &
2 (k

Mo) = 0), NMo encourages greater entry, with the above discussed welfare
e¤ects.
Proposition 2 In the setup involving time-varying demand, for certain para-
meter values, it is possible that NMo encourages greater entry.3
3The result follows from the computation of the equilibria. Detailed calculations are avail-
able upon request.
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4 Vertical Integration and Market Power
One of the major concerns among the policy makers is that the merchant lines
built and operated by rms that are active in the generation sector can be
harmful from the public welfare standpoint. In fact, the European Union has
per se banned any generating rm from investing in transmission network. How-
ever, from an economic standpoint, the debate on allowing generators to invest
in merchant transmission is not yet been robustly analyzed. The litertaure so
far has mostly focused on the legal and international relations perspectives (de
Hauteclocque and Rious (2011) and Nowak (2010)). One of the crucial reasons
behind the concerns of the EU is that the merchant investors involved in gen-
eration may have an incentive to behave anti-competitively by restricting the
available capacity in the market.4 In this context there are some important
questions that need to be addressed: How valid are these concerns of the EU
keeping in mind consumer welfare? Under what conditions would allowing ver-
tical integration lead to a loss/gain in consumer surplus? In this section we
analyze these broad questions under the assumption that the generators hold
some market power. We show that the answer drastically di¤ers depending
upon where the market power for the generators really is (e¢ cient/exporting or
ine¢ cient/importing nodes).
Formally, we consider two regions with di¤ering e¢ ciency. The cost structure
is analogous to our baseline version. For rms operating in the N is C (QN ) =
4One assumption we make throughout this section is that even if merchant investor owns a
generator, he cannot bar other generators from utilising his transmission line to export/import
electricity.
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cNQN , while for rms in the S it is C (QS) = cNQN +
cSQ
2
N
2 , and the electricity
demand is concentrated in Node S. The demand function for electricity in S is:
DS(pS) = a  pS
We then analyze two di¤erent situations, one in which the more e¢ cient region
(N) has a monopoly in generation with the other zone being competitive, and
vice versa. For each of the two instances, we analyze two sequential games
(whose structure parallels that described in Section 2), one in which the gen-
erator with market power is banned (B) from investing in transmission, and
a second one in which the generator with market power does invest in trans-
mission (NB). Under this assumption, we consider two interrelated questions.
First, under what conditions a generator may nd it protable to invest in build-
ing additional transmission capacity; second, to what extent aMo rule could be
useful in preventing episodes of abuse of dominant positions on the transmission
line by generators with market power.
If the market power is vested in the hands of the generator in the e¢ cient
(exporting) node, then only that generator has an incentive to invest in trans-
mission network. The intuition behind this result is as follows: the only source
of revenue for the transmission network operator is the price di¤erential between
the nodes. Further, since the investment in setting up transmission network is
sunk, and the marginal cost is zero, the transmission network owner is going
to open up the line for transmission as long as the price di¤erential is positive.
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Given this, the generator in the e¢ cient node is going to set the prices very
close the ones prevailing in the ine¢ cient node. This is not su¢ cient for the
transmission network owner to recover his sunk investment, which in turn, leads
to lack of incentive to invest. If vertical integration is allowed, then the gener-
ator with market power is interested in investing in the transmission network,
as long as the aggreate net prot is positive. On the other hand, we argue that
if the market power is vested in the hands of the generator in the ine¢ cient
node, then the results are not that unambiguous. It is possible that allowing
for vertical integration would harm welfare. The main intuition for this result is
that the generator in the ine¢ cient node would under-invest in order to limit the
competition from the e¢ cient node. Further, the generator could build capacity
and leave it unused, while preventing entry of other merchant investors. There-
fore, we also argue thatMo is a more suitable provision than NMo because the
option of using excess capacity as a deterrent is eliminated.
We start by analyzing the case of market power in the exporting (N) node.
4.1 Market Power in the Exporting Node
Suppose, node S is competitive. The rms in this node sell at a price pS =
cN + cSqS . Therefore, qS =
pS cN
cS
. Also, assume that there is a single rm, a
residual demand monopolist in node N , whose quality is qN and a price pN :5
In order to avoid arbitrage, we need to have pN = pS = p:The overall demand
for Node S is given by qS + qN = a  p. Therefore, the demand for the residual
5Observe that, given the assumption of residual demand monopolist, the assumption of
whether the rm sets prices or quantities does not really matter.
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demand monopolist in node N is given by: qN = a p  qS = a p 

p cN
cS

=
1
cS
(acS + cN   p  pcS) or p = 1cS+1 (cN + acS   cSqN ).
Observe that, as expected, residual demand increases in cN , since cN de-
creases qS . Consider the case where the monopolist in N is using an existing
network (of su¢ ciently high capacity) to export electricity to S. Since there
is no indigenous demand in Node S, whatever he produces is for the export
market.In such case, he would be solving the following problem:
@

1
cS+1
(cN + acS   cSqN )

qN   cNqN

@qN
= 0 (3)
This implies qN =
1
2
a  1
2
cN if k >
1
2
a  1
2
cN
or qN = k if k  1
2
a  1
2
cN
The total price prevailing in the market is:
p =
1
cS + 1

cN +
1
2
cSa+
1
2
cNcS

At this quantity, the total supply by the competitive market in S is:
qS =
p  cN
cS
=
1
cS+1

cN +
1
2cSa+
1
2cNcS
	  cN
cS
If, on the other hand, the merchant investor were to invest in vertical inte-
gration, then he solves the following problem:
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@

1
cS+1
(cN + acS   cSqN )

qN   cNqN   rqN

@qN
= 0 (4)
This implies qN =
1
2cS
(acS   r   rcS   cNcS)
Observe that qN  0 if r  1cS+1 (acS   cNcS). For the rest of the analysis,
we assume that this condition is satised.
This implies
p =
1
cS + 1

1
2
r + cN +
1
2
acS +
1
2
rcS +
1
2
cNcS

:
Further,
qS =
p  cN
cS
=
1
cS+1
 
1
2r + cN +
1
2acS +
1
2rcS +
1
2cNcS
  cN
cS
Proposition 3 Only the rm involved in exporting has the incentive to build
the transmission line as a merchant investor. All the other parties (including
the independent merchant investors) do not have an incentive to invest because
they would incur a loss. Allowing generators to invest in transmission capacity
increases total welfare. Whether Mo is in place or not is indi¤erent for our
results
Proof. If the generator in the exporting node with market power is not verti-
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cally integrated, it has the following strategy that allows it to extract the full
surplus from the transmission network under perfect information: produce qN
and charge pN = pS   . The operator on the transmission network will obtain
close to zero net prot from transmission, as the rm in the exporting node will
internalize the full prot. Given the presence of xed costs, any investor other
than the generator has no incentive to invest. When the generator invests, he
has an incentive to fully use capacity, regardless of whether he is forced to do
so by a Mo provision. Using capacity is valuable for the investor.
Does it make sense for the generator in N to invest in the rst place? The
answer would be trivial because, if there is no interconnection between the nodes,
then the generator in node N will not be able to produce anything because of
the lack of indigenous demand, and the ine¢ cient generators in the S would
have to cater to the entire demand. Also, notice that given the structure of the
game, the choice of regime: Mo or NMo really does not matter since capacity
will be optimally used in both cases.
Van Koten (2011) and Sauma and Oren (2009), while considering a di¤erent
framework than ours (involving nancial transmission rights in Sauma and Oren,
and an explicit auction for the capacity allocation in Van Koten), obtain similar
results to those obtained in our paper.
4.2 Market Power in the Importing Node
When the rm in the importing node has market power, then vertical integration
may not be an unambiguous answer if looked at from an economic e¢ ciency
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stand point. Further, the regime of capacity utilization (Mo vs. NMo) does play
a role in determining the degree of e¢ ciency in this case. Given the tediousness
of calculations involved, we do not present the entire proofs here, but will provide
a general intuition for why that is the case. The detailed calculations necessary
to prove these arguments are available with the authors.
Consider the case where there is a monopolist generator in the ine¢ cient
node, S. Node N , the e¢ cient one has several rms that generate electricity
and there is perfect competition in place. Like earlier, there is no market for
electricity in N , and the entire consumption happens in the South. In such
case, it is clear that the monopolist in S would prefer that the interconnection
not exist, or that an ine¢ ciently low level of interconnection prevails. If inter-
connection does exist and can accommodate a high enough capacity, then the
monopoly generator would face competition from the N market.
Hence, a vertically integrated potential merchant investor, who faces no
competition by other merchant investors, has an incentive to set an ine¢ ciently
low level of merchant capacity.
When we move to a sequential entry game, it turns out that the capacity
utilization mode becomes crucial. We consider two alternative structures of the
game. In the rst one, vertical integration is not allowed, and two independent
(i.e., not involved in the generation business) merchant investors sequentially
invest before electricity generation takes place. In the second one, the rst mer-
chant investor is the monopolistic generator, who is followed by an independent
merchant investor (second mover). Subsequently, electricity generation takes
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place. The reason why the vertically integrated investor moves rst is that the
major policy concerns (e.g., with European authorities) arise precisely when
there is no other line in place; in such a situation, the vertically integrated
investor would be the rst mover.
The objective function of the vertically integrated merchant in a sequential
entry game is:
max
q1
(a  qI   qE   qel) qel   C (qel) + qI (pS   cN )
where qel stands for the electricity quantity, while q1 and q2 stand for the in-
terconnection capacity made available respectively by rm 1 (the vertically in-
tegrated company) and by rm 2.
Under NMo, if vertical integration is allowed, then the generator in node
S has an incentive to invest in interconnection, and leave the transmission line
idle. Should there be an entry into the transmission market, then the monopo-
list can credibly threaten to use the invested capacity and compete in quantities,
as above. If the xed cost is very low, then there is an incentive for another
merchant investor to actually invest in interconnection, and connect the e¢ -
cient and ine¢ cient nodes. However, if the xed cost is su¢ ciently high (more
than the prots that the other investor would make in the duopoly market),
then under NMo entry does not take place, and the transmission capacity does
not translate into actual transmission of electricity. Therefore, the presence of
e¢ cient generators in Node N does not make any di¤erence to the consumer
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welfare for the demanders of electricity in node S.
Mo, instead, does not allow the strategy of building capacity and leaving it
idle. As a result,Mo is preferable to NMo under market power in the importing
node.
Joskow and tirole (2000) show a similar result, albiet in an alternative setting
comparing nancial rights of transmission vis-a-vis physical transmission rights..
They show that physical transmission rights reduce welfare vis-à-vis nancial
transmission rights, as the former allow for capacity withholding.
5 Collusion
In this section we do not provide a fully specied model on relative performance
of the two regines when there is a possibility of collusion among the transmission
networks. However, we provide some theoretical arguments on the merits of
either regime when collusion can be a realistic possibility. For that reason, we
move back to the market where there are several generators in each node that are
perfectly competitive. We provide some intuition on how the Mo arrangement
may a¤ect results in a dynamic context.
The economic literature thus far has been able to document the role of
excess (idle) capacity in a duopoly as a means to sustain collusion (Davidson
and Deneckere (1990)). The argument is that a low capacity increases prot,
which, in a Nash-reversion setting represents represents the prot that prevails
after a rm deviates from the collusive agreement. The threat of punishment in
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response to deviation is therefore, less severe. Therefore, temptation to deviate
increase making the sustinance of cartel tougher. Larger capacity (even if kept
idle) would ensure that the deviation can be punished, thereby reducing the
temptation to deviate making cartel more sustainable. A regulatory regime like
Mo does not allow idle capacity to exist. Therefore, while there might be under-
investment ex ante, the possibility of collusion itself reduces. In this sense, Mo
is better suited than NMo when one suspects collusion.
As Benoit and Krishna (BK) (1991) point out commitments that make
predatory behavior in the post-entry game credible also increase the prospects
for collusion. This is because in a dynamic setting, a greater degree of collusion
may be supported by the increased severity of available threats. The entrant
may view the rst movers choice as a commitment to collude. While in a
static setting high capacity provides the rst mover with a commitment towards
aggressive behavior if entry occurred, in a dynamic setting this same strategy
may be interpreted as a commitment to collude. This is because it reduces
continuation prot after deviation.
At the same time, however, Mo may benet the rst mover. By provid-
ing credibility to the use of capacity, it may allow the rst mover to play the
monopoly output, while leaving the new entrant out.
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6 Policy Implications and Conclusion
In this paper we investigate which of the capacity utilization regimes: Mo or
NMo is better suited from a welfare standpoint. First, we look at relative
trade-o¤s of these two regimes in the case where the demand is uctuating
across various time periods. A major policy implication of the results we have
developed in this section is that it is not ex ante clear which of the capacity
utilization regimes: Mo or NMo, is better suited from a consumer welfare
point of view. While capacity investment is likely to be higher in NMo than
under Mo, it is not necessary that the installed capacity actually results in
transmission capacity being made available. The answer to the question of which
regime is better really depends on not only the di¤erence in e¢ ciency levels
between the generators in either node, the extent of demand for electricity, and
the di¤erence in the demand for interconnection across di¤erent time periods.
Therefore, from a policy perspective, the appropriate choice of regime becomes
an empirical question. An appropriate research design needs to rst estimate
the demand functions in both zones, and the pattern of competition in the
market in order to estimate the demand for transmission. Next, the using the
estimated market structure, the but-for market needs to be simulated under the
two capacity utilization regimes in order to calculate consumer welfare under
both regimes. A similar approach was used in Bo¤a, Pingali and Vannoni (2010)
in order to estimate the welfare measures pertaining to transmission network in
the Italian electricity market.
The next issue we investigate in this paper is that of vertical integration
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where generators of electricity are also allowed to invest in transmission network.
Within the context of merchant investment, one policy recommendation is that
in case the generator in the most e¢ cient node has market power, vertical inte-
gration is the only way to achieve welfare enhancing investment in transmission
network. This is irrespective of which capacity utilization regime (Mo orNMo)
is in vogue. Another pertinent question to ask is whether the regulated investe-
ment in transmssion network yields better results vis-a-vis merchant investment.
Our model clearly demonstrates that there is a private party (monopolist in the
e¢ cient zone) who has nanical incentives to build interconnection. Further,
the regulated investment may also su¤ers from asymmetric information in terms
of costs of the building interconnection, lack of knowledge in terms of ideal lo-
cation to build interconnection, etc. A merchant investor, on the other hand, is
likely to have superior knowledge of these issues; and if the merchant investor
also happens to be the monopolist generator in the e¢ cient zone, then right -
nancial incentives as well. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that merchant
investment (via vertical integration) is indeed preferable! Littlechild (2012), in
the context of Australian electricity market points out that, "Merchant Trans-
misison has generally not exhibited the standard examples of market failure but
regulated transmission generally has exhibited the standard examples of reg-
ulatory failure." To this extent we agree with the claims in de Hauteclocque
and Rious (2011) and Van Koten (2013) who showed that a generator would be
relatively more aggressive in bidding for merchant investment.
On the other hand, when the generator in the importing node has market
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power, the claims of de Hauteclocque and Rious (2011) need to be caveated
further. Our analysis shows that vertical integration is not unambiguously wel-
fare enhancing, and the answer does depend on the parameter values. Further,
what can be claimed unambiguously is that, if vertical integration is indeed the
superior alternative, then Mo is a better framework than NMo. This is be-
cause the monopolist generator in the ine¢ cient node has an incentive to build
interconnection capacity, and leave it unused in order to prevent competition.
Adopting the Mo regime precludes such behavior. Therefore, in such situation,
the claims made by Nowak (2010) seem more valid.
As an extension, a natural question to ask is what happens when generators
in both zones have market power. As long as one node is more e¢ cient than
the other, our conclusions do not change qualitatively. An interesting case
emerges when there is market power in both zones, and the generators are
equally e¢ cient. In such situation, interconnection leads to higher consumer
welfare, not because of e¢ ciency reasons, but because of increase in competition
from the generators in the other node. While we do not model this question
explicitly in this paper, literature on transmission capacities in economics does
provide some answers. Borenstein, Bushnell and Stoft (1997) argue that the
provision of interconnection between the two nodes, even with limited capacity,
is enough to mitigate exploitation of market power.6
6However, they also show that for a small transmission capacity, then only mixed strategy
equilibrium exists in terms of quantity setting on the part of the rms. Since mixed strategies
are di¢ cult to interpret from a policy perspective, we can only conclude that even with limited
investment in transmission capacity, there should be huge gains from consumer welfare point
of view.
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A nal issue we address in this paper pertains to the possibility of collu-
sion among various transmission network investors. The economic literature on
collusion does suggest that excess capacity can be e¤ectively used as a mecha-
nism to sustain a cartel because idle capacity can be used as a threat to punish
anyone deviating from cartel. Given that capacity augmentation in the trans-
mission network is not instantaneous, lack of excess capacity could hinder the
ability of a cartel to punish any deviations. Therefore, a policy recommendation
in this context is that, in order to pre-empt strategic exploitation of excess (but
idle) capacity, Mo does appear to be a superior alternative when compared to
NMo.
As for our original question of which capacity utilization regime (NMo or
Mo) is better, the answer is contextual. Fluctuations in demand for trans-
mission, degree of relative e¢ ciencies in electricity generation, and competitive
structure of electricity generation (degree of market power and feasibility of col-
lusion), determine which regime is superior. Therefore, from a policy makers
perspective, a careful and structured assessment of market conditions in these
directions is required before nalizing the choice of regime.
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